Uganda’s war on terrorism under President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has become one of the defining features of the country’s security policy and regional diplomacy. From the deadly Al-Shabaab bombings in Kampala in July 2010 to attacks linked to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Islamic State’s Central African network, Uganda has confronted a threat that extends beyond its borders. Its response has combined military force, intelligence operations, regional partnerships and international cooperation. Yet the war has also exacted a painful human, economic and political price.
The central question is no longer whether Uganda should fight terrorism. It must. The more important question is how the country can sustain that fight while protecting its citizens, strengthening public institutions and ensuring that the burden is shared by the international community.
On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab suicide bombers struck crowds watching the FIFA World Cup final in Kampala. More than 70 people were killed, exposing Uganda’s vulnerability to an international terrorist network and demonstrating the consequences of its military involvement in Somalia.
The attacks did not persuade Kampala to retreat from its regional security responsibilities. Uganda remained a major contributor to the African Union’s mission in Somalia, where its troops helped combat Al-Shabaab and support the internationally recognised Somali government. However, the emergence of new threats demonstrated that military engagement abroad could not, by itself, guarantee security at home.
In 2021, Uganda experienced a new wave of attacks attributed to the ADF, an armed group operating from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that has also been associated with the Islamic State. Bombings in Kampala in October and November killed civilians and security personnel, while a June assassination attempt against then-former Chief of Defence Forces Gen. Katumba Wamala killed his daughter and driver.
The danger became even more apparent in 2023. On June 16, attackers struck a school in Mpondwe, Kasese District, killing at least 42 people, according to the US State Department’s terrorism report. In October, suspected ADF militants killed two foreign tourists and their Ugandan guide in Queen Elizabeth National Park.
These attacks struck at the heart of national confidence: the safety of children, the protection of ordinary citizens and Uganda’s reputation as a destination for international tourism.
The government’s strategy has increasingly focused on confronting armed groups in their bases rather than waiting for them to strike inside Uganda. In November 2021, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) launched Operation Shujaa jointly with the Armed Forces of the DRC. The operation targeted ADF positions in eastern Congo, where difficult terrain, weak state control and cross-border networks have complicated efforts to eliminate the group.
This approach reflects a strategic calculation: Uganda’s security is inseparable from the stability of its neighbours. Terrorist organisations can exploit poorly governed territory, move across porous borders and establish networks that extend into regional capitals.
Uganda has also invested in intelligence-led operations, arrests, financial monitoring and efforts to disrupt planned attacks. International cooperation has supported these efforts, including measures against terrorist financing and the movement of suspected militants.
In February 2024, the Financial Action Task Force removed Uganda from its increased-monitoring, or “grey”, list after reforms to its anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing framework.
Nevertheless, military pressure must not be confused with permanent victory. The absence of reported terrorist incidents inside Uganda in 2024, noted in the US State Department’s country report, was encouraging. It did not mean that the threat had disappeared.
The persistence of armed groups in eastern Congo illustrates why battlefield successes must be accompanied by intelligence cooperation, effective border management, accountable security institutions and measures that prevent recruitment into violent extremism.
The first and most devastating cost is human. Families have lost children, breadwinners and loved ones. Survivors carry physical and psychological scars, while communities affected by violence must rebuild their confidence and livelihoods.
The military cost is equally significant. Uganda has committed troops, equipment, logistics and public resources to operations at home and abroad. In Somalia, this commitment has included serious casualties. In May 2023, Al-Shabaab overran a Ugandan forward operating base, killing at least 54 UPDF personnel, according to the US State Department.
Such losses underline the sacrifice involved in protecting not only Uganda but also regional security.
The economic consequences are less easily measured. Terror attacks can discourage tourists, unsettle investors, increase security expenditure and damage the image of a country whose economy depends partly on confidence in its stability. The killings of tourists in Queen Elizabeth National Park in 2023 demonstrated how violence can threaten both human life and an important source of foreign exchange.
Money spent on counterterrorism is necessary, but it also competes with other national priorities, including healthcare, education, roads and employment. The government therefore has a responsibility to demonstrate that security expenditure is effective, properly audited and directed towards genuine threats.
A security policy that alienates the very communities whose cooperation is needed can undermine its own objectives. Intelligence depends not only on surveillance and informants but also on public trust. Suspects must be investigated fairly, evidence must withstand judicial scrutiny, and innocent citizens must be protected from collective suspicion.
Uganda’s contribution to international counterterrorism has earned it an important place in regional security arrangements. Its participation in Somalia has supported wider African Union and United Nations efforts to contain Al-Shabaab, while its joint operations with Congolese forces have advanced the shared objective of weakening the ADF.
International assistance has included logistical support, training, intelligence cooperation and technical expertise. In March 2026, the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism convened consultations in Kampala on strengthening Uganda’s capacity to counter the terrorist use of improvised explosive devices.
These partnerships acknowledge a fundamental reality: terrorism crosses borders, and no single country can defeat it alone.
Yet Uganda and other African troop-contributing countries have repeatedly faced the challenge of securing predictable financing for regional missions. At a time when African soldiers bear substantial operational risks, international commitments must translate into dependable funding, equipment, medical evacuation capabilities and support for those who lose their lives.
Uganda should continue demanding a fairer distribution of these responsibilities. International partners cannot expect African governments to shoulder the human and financial burden indefinitely while external support remains uncertain.
At the same time, assistance should strengthen national institutions rather than create permanent dependence. Regional governments must invest in capable security forces, intelligence sharing, accountable policing and the development of communities vulnerable to extremist recruitment.
Winning the Peace, Not Just the War
Museveni’s counterterrorism legacy must ultimately be judged on more than military operations or the number of suspected militants killed. It must also be measured by whether Ugandans can live, work, study and travel without fear.
That requires a broader strategy. Communities near conflict zones need functioning schools, health facilities, employment opportunities and effective local administration. Victims and survivors deserve support. Young people vulnerable to recruitment need credible alternatives to violence. Religious and community leaders should be partners in preventing radicalisation, not treated as suspects by default.
Security agencies, meanwhile, must operate within the law. Accountability is not a concession to terrorists; it is essential to the legitimacy and long-term effectiveness of the state.
Uganda has demonstrated a willingness to confront terrorism at considerable cost, including by deploying its forces beyond its borders. Its international partners have recognised the importance of that contribution, although the sustainability of regional security operations remains a concern.
The enduring challenge is to convert military pressure into lasting stability. Terrorist networks may be weakened through force, but durable peace also requires functioning institutions, public trust, regional cooperation and international solidarity.
Uganda must remain vigilant. But the ultimate measure of success will not simply be the absence of explosions. It will be a country where citizens feel secure, rights are respected, businesses can thrive and public resources serve both national defence and human development.
That is the peace worth fighting for.
The author is the Deputy RCC for Nakawa Division.
English 