The Supreme Court has ruled that a person who inherits an interest in land from a deceased parent can qualify as a bona fide occupant even if the parent died before the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, provided the deceased had occupied and utilised the land for more than 12 years before his death.
The ruling arose from a long-running land dispute between Sempijja Sekyanzi and businessman Prof. Gordon Wavamunno over approximately three acres of land comprised in Busiro Block 447 Plot 5 in Bufulu Village, Katabi Sub-County, Wakiso District.
In a decision delivered in Kampala in November 2026, the Supreme Court allowed Sekyanzi’s appeal, setting aside an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal which had denied him recognition as a bona fide occupant.
The five-member Supreme Court panel comprised Justices Elizabeth Musoke, Stephen Musota, Catherine Bamugemereire, Monica Kalyegira Mugenyi and Muzamiru Mutangula Kibeedi.
In the lead judgment, Justice Kibeedi held that Sekyanzi inherited a legally recognisable interest in the disputed land from his father, the late Sempijja George, who had occupied and utilised the property for more than 12 years before his death in 1985.
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether Sekyanzi could qualify as a bona fide occupant by inheriting his father’s interest, considering that his father died about 10 years before the 1995 Constitution came into force.
The dispute dates back to 2007 when Sekyanzi sued Wavamunno in the Chief Magistrate’s Court of Entebbe, accusing him of grabbing and unlawfully alienating his family’s kibanja interest on the Mailo land.
Sekyanzi told court that he inherited the land interest from his father following his death in 1985. He initially claimed that the kibanja measured approximately three acres, although he later testified that it covered about two acres.
He sought vacant possession, general and exemplary damages, interest and costs of the suit.
Wavamunno denied the allegations, maintaining that he had been the registered proprietor of the land since December 24, 1984, and that the property had remained unoccupied until Sekyanzi allegedly began extracting soil from it.
Wavamunno further told court that on January 23, 2007, the two parties voluntarily entered into an agreement under which Sekyanzi undertook to stop conducting activities on the land in exchange for Shillings 175,000 to facilitate the removal of his bricks.
He also informed court that he had subsequently sold the disputed property to a third party, Winfred Lalani.
However, the trial magistrate found that Sekyanzi was a bona fide occupant after considering evidence that his father had occupied and utilised the land for more than 12 years before his death without being challenged by the registered proprietor or his agents.
The magistrate relied on testimony from witnesses who confirmed that Sekyanzi’s father had lived on the land and planted coffee trees before his death.
The court consequently ordered Wavamunno to compensate Sekyanzi for his interest as a bona fide occupant, with the amount to be determined by the Chief Government Valuer. It also awarded him Shillings three million in general damages and costs.
Wavamunno challenged the decision in the High Court’s Land Division, but the court upheld the magistrate’s findings, agreeing that the period of occupation by Sekyanzi and his father could be considered together.
The High Court found that the father had occupied the land for more than 12 years before his death in 1985, while Sekyanzi inherited the interest in 1986 and had personally occupied it for approximately 10 years by the time the 1995 Constitution came into force.
The court concluded that their combined period of occupation exceeded the constitutional threshold and upheld the order for compensation.
However, Wavamunno appealed to the Court of Appeal, which overturned the decisions of the two lower courts.
The Court of Appeal held that Sekyanzi did not qualify as a bona fide occupant because he had personally occupied the land for only 10 years before the 1995 Constitution came into force, short of the 12 years required under Section 29 of the Land Act.
The appellate court further reasoned that Sekyanzi’s father could not have acquired the status of a bona fide occupant because he died in 1985, before the Constitution and the Land Act established that legal classification.
It consequently held that Sekyanzi could not inherit a status his father did not legally possess at the time of his death.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Sekyanzi first sought permission from the Court of Appeal to challenge the ruling in the Supreme Court, but his application was dismissed in October 2020.
He subsequently obtained a certificate of general public importance from the Supreme Court in July 2023, allowing him to pursue a third appeal limited to the question of whether he could inherit his father’s interest and qualify as a bona fide occupant.
In his judgment, Justice Kibeedi acknowledged that the Land Act of 1998 could not ordinarily be applied retrospectively to create legal rights that did not exist when a person died.
However, he said applying that interpretation strictly in the circumstances would produce an unjust and absurd outcome by extinguishing the interests of families whose predecessors had occupied land for more than 12 years but died shortly before the 1995 Constitution was promulgated.
He observed that such an interpretation would disadvantage families whose benefactors died between October 9, 1983 and October 8, 1995, while protecting families whose predecessors died after the Constitution came into force.
Justice Kibeedi said the courts had developed the purposive approach to statutory interpretation to address situations where a literal interpretation of the law produces absurd consequences and defeats the intention of Parliament.
He traced the protection of long-term land occupation to the Limitation Act, which has historically protected people who occupy land continuously and without interruption for more than 12 years.
Under Sections 5 and 6 of the Limitation Act, an action to recover land cannot ordinarily be brought after the expiry of 12 years from the date the right of action accrued.
Section 16 further provides for the extinguishment of the title of a person who fails to recover land within the prescribed limitation period.
Justice Kibeedi reasoned that Sekyanzi’s father had acquired an interest through adverse possession after occupying the land for more than 12 years before his death in 1985.
He therefore found that the interest inherited by Sekyanzi was not extinguished merely because the father died before the 1995 Constitution and the subsequent Land Act came into force.
The judge further observed that Article 237(8) of the Constitution guarantees security of occupancy for lawful and bona fide occupants of Mailo, freehold and leasehold land.
He said the constitutional provision was intended to recognise and strengthen existing occupancy interests rather than create an entirely new category of people with rights over land.
Justice Kibeedi added that Parliament, through Article 237(9), was required to enact legislation regulating the relationship between registered landowners and lawful or bona fide occupants, including provisions enabling occupants to acquire registrable interests.
The resulting Land Act defined a bona fide occupant under Section 29(2) as a person who, before the coming into force of the Constitution, had occupied, utilised or developed land without challenge from the registered owner or the owner’s agent for at least 12 years.
Section 29(5) also recognises a person who purchases or otherwise acquires the interest of someone qualified to be a bona fide occupant.
Justice Kibeedi said the definition under Section 29 was not exhaustive and did not exclude people who inherited interests from deceased persons who had already occupied registered land for more than 12 years before their deaths.
He held that Sekyanzi belonged to this category because his father had accumulated the required period of occupation before dying in 1985.
Consequently, the judge answered the question before the Supreme Court in the affirmative, declaring that Sekyanzi qualified as a bona fide occupant by virtue of inheriting his father’s interest.
He set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated the orders of the High Court, although on different legal grounds.
The Supreme Court also awarded Sekyanzi half of the taxed costs incurred before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, noting that his submissions had only been partially useful in resolving the appeal. The costs awarded by the High Court and the magistrate’s court were left undisturbed.
In a separate but concurring judgment, Justice Catherine Bamugemereire agreed that Sekyanzi qualified as a bona fide occupant, emphasising the importance of considering continuity of family occupation rather than examining the period during which the successor personally occupied the land in isolation.
Justice Bamugemereire observed that the trial court and the High Court had made concurrent findings that the land had been continuously occupied, with the cultivation of coffee trees and other perennial crops providing evidence of longstanding family use.
She faulted the Court of Appeal for failing to give sufficient consideration to those findings and the legal significance of the father’s previous occupation.
She nevertheless cautioned that inheritance does not automatically confer bona fide occupancy status in every case, arguing that courts must establish the nature of the predecessor’s interest and determine whether the successor satisfies the applicable legal requirements.
Justices Monica Kalyegira Mugenyi, Stephen Musota and Elizabeth Musoke also agreed with Justice Kibeedi’s conclusions and proposed orders, bringing the five-member panel to a unanimous position on the outcome of the appeal.






























